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THE FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER ACT OF 1935
JOHN J. GEORGE

I. THE BACKGROUND

FOR THE LEGISLATION

During the last decade a multitude of unconnected local motor carrier
enterprises have been transformed into a co-ordinated nation-wide
system of transportation intrastate and interstate. Systematic transportation service has reached 45,000 inland communities, and created
competition with established rail carriers serving communities already
articulated. Passenger miles operated by steam railroads declined 4o%
from 3o billion in 1930 to 18 billion in 1934; but common carrier busses
increased their operation ioo from IO to ii billion. Electric railway
operation decreased by more than 30% in the 5-year period. While
steam and electric railways experienced a serious decline in passengers,
those transported by public carrier busses increased 25% from 1.7
billions in 1931 to 2.2 billions in 1934. In the same period revenue realized from operation of electric railway cars declined 25% from 695
million dollars to 531 million. Class I steam railroads fared even worse,
their revenue falling 37% from 555 million dollars to 346 million. But
total revenue of public busses dropped only 8% in 1933 as over 1931,
and 1934 found all the loss erased and a slight improvement over the
1931 figure of 31o million dollars.' Locomotives and freight cars in
operation have decreased 25 and 16% respectively from 1925 to 1934;
railway originating tonnage, carloadings, and passengers declined 45,
4o, and 5o% respectively in the same period. Revenue passenger miles
were cut in half, average freight revenue per ton mile fell 16% and
average revenue per passenger mile decreased by 33%. Railroad 1.c.l.
freight declined 57% from 1920 to 1931 and the rate of return earned
by railroads declined from 4.99% in 1926 to 2% in 1931, and to 1.79
in 1934.2
'Bus FACTS FOR 1935, 4, 5, 6.
'YEARBOOK OF RAILROAD INFORMATION (1932) 30, 34, 40; Id. (1934) 51. The
following table based on figures in Id. (935) 20-34, presents graphically the
operation of Class I railroads for the years 1925, 193o and 1934, and motor truck
and automobile registration for the same years:
1925
1930
1934
Locomotives in operation
63,000
56,o0
48,ooo
Freight cars in operation
2,357,000
2,276,oo0
1,938,000
Miles of main track abandoned
6o6
694
1,995
Originating tonnage (millions)
1,247
1,153
765
Carloadings (millions)
51
45
30
Passengers transported (millions)
888
703
449
Revenue passenger miles (billions)
35
26
IS
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While there is no means of determining the degree of railroad loss
attributable to interstate motor carriers, even the casual observer would
reckon it at no insignificant figure. The revival of motor production in
1935 and the extensive improvement being made in highways lead to
the inevitable conclusion that bus and truck competition with rail transportation will not abate but rather will be sharply accentuated. Railroads disclaim all desire to "limit the proper development of commercial motor transportation," but admit that highway competition "has
presented a number of difficult problems which must be solved in the
public interest."3
For twenty years state efforts at regulating intrastate operation have
proved increasingly satisfactory, 4 and for the first half of this period
practically no distinction was made as to interstate operation. State
regulation even in that field went unchallenged. But in 1925 the Buck
and Bush decisions denied state power to refuse a certificate for interstate motor transportation on the ground that existing service is
adequate. 5 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions checked state efforts
Average freight revenue per ton mile
(cents)
Average revenue per passenger mile
(cents)

Motor trucks registered (millions)
Passenger motor cars registered
(millions)

1.097

I.O63

o.978

2.938

2.717

i918

2.4

3.4

3.4

17.4

23

21.5

Commercial transportation of goods by truck possesses decided advantages over
railroad freight service: elimination of crating, door-call and delivery, adaptability of time of departure and arrival, accessibility to inland communities, and

flexibility in the arrangement of load and route combinations. In many areas,
particularly metropolitan regions, these advantages account for increasing resort

to motor freight service, the distance range of which is being constantly extended.
Legal distinctions, sometimes painfully drawn, have marked this motor freight
service into two classifications: common carriers, who operate on regular routes
between fixed points and on a definite schedule, and offer service indiscriminately
to the public, and contract carriers, who solicit and accept business from only
particular customers under private agreement, offer no service to the public
indiscriminately, and who until very recently enjoyed practically unrestricted
freedom in routing and time schedule. For the legal and administrative development of the differentiation see two articles by the writer: Who is a Motor Common Carrier? (1929) 8 Bus TRANSPORTATION 247; and Public Control of Contract Motor Carriers (1933) 9 JOURNAL oF'LAND AND PuDLIc UTITIY EcoNOMICS 236.

'YEARaoox OF

RAILROAD INFoRmATIoN (1934)

32.

'For a systematic treatment of all state efforts at regulation through 1928 see
the writer's MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION IN THE UNIrED STATES (1929).
'Id. 217-220; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 45 Sup. Ct. 324, 69 L. ed. 623
(1925). George W. Bush & Sons v. Maloy, 267 U. S.317, 45 Sup. Ct. 326, 69 L.
ed. 627 (1925).
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at controlling contract carriers as common carriers,0 and at applying
liability insurance requirements to interstate carriers of passengers as
to intrastate. 7 While the states have a wide discretion in taxing the
users of the highways and interstate carriers cannot escape a reasonable
contribution for the facilities furnished,8 the states cannot impose a
tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate motor transportation. 9
Accepting the view that state power can be validly applied to many
phases of motor carrier operation which are local in character, the
Court has been decidedly liberal in permitting the application of state
measures to interstate motor commerce because of absence of Federal
regulation thereon.10 Despite the lengths to which state power over
interstate operation has been validly applied, the pronouncements
checking state power have been sufficiently numerous and restrictive to
indicate the inability of states adequately to deal with the problem and
to point to Federal regulation as inevitable.
Thus the last decade has witnessed a combination of forces leading
to Congressional action. Those forces include the magnitude of interstate motor transportation, inability of the states to control it adequately, the resulting injurious effects of unregulated interstate motor activity on regulated intrastate operation, on railroads, their employees,
and shippers, on highway taxpayer-users, and on the increasing
urgency of problems of public safety on the highways. The move for
Federal regulation has been manifest in every session of Congress since
1926, the most serious effort being the abortive Parker bill of 1930.1
Supporting the move for the last three years can be listed the Coordinator of Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
state utility commissions, the bus industry, some of the shippers, and
part of the trucking concerns. All carriers see the need for some type
of regulation, more adequate than that under the N.R.A. codes. Railroads view motor carrier regulation as a weapon in their own defense.
The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933 imposed on
the Coordinator the duty of studying means for improving transporta6

Frost v. Railroad Commission of California,

27,

U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 6o5,

7o L. ed. 1oi (926).
'Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 Sup. Ct. 502, 72 L. ed. 833 (928).
'Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 702, 7 L. ed. 1199 (1927) ; Interstate Busses v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245, 48 Sup. Ct 215, 72 L. ed. 55, (1928).

'Interstate Transit Co. v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183, 5, Sup. Ct 380, 75 L. ed.
953 (i93i) ; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct.
553, 72 L. ed. 927 (1928).

"°Justice Brandeis in Buck opinion, sitpra note 5; Chief Justice Hughes in
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 52 Sup. Ct. 58i, 76 L. ed. 1167 (1932).

'The substance, career, and fate of this measure are presented in the writer's
InterstateMotor CarrierRegulation in 1930 (1931) io Bus TRAwsPORTATION 575.
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tion beyond those means set forth in the act. n1a Coordinator Eastman
has conducted elaborate surveys, and has made three reports to Congress. That of March 1o, 1934 recommended regulation of motor
carriers similar to that embodied in Senate bill 1629,12 and as a "result
of additional study, experience, exchange of ideas between the Coordinator, the shippers and the motor-carrier industry," S. 1629 was
proposed in the Coordinator's annual report for 1934.13
In his message to Congress, January 1935, the President urged
motor carrier regulation along the lines of the Eastman recommendations. On February 4 Senator Wheeler introduced Senate bill 1629,
and a similar bill appeared simultaneously in the House. Hearings
were held over several weeks, those of the Senate being recorded in
607 pages of testimony.
Reported out on April 12 the bill was discussed at length in the
Senate three days later. Without a record vote it was passed the next
day, 8o of the 87 amendments being added without debate. Sent to the
House April 17, the bill experienced a slower progress. After more
extensive hearings than had been necessary in the Senate the bill
caused noticeable disagreement in the House committee, whose subcommittee at one stage proposed unsuccessfully a substitute bill. Not
till the last of July was the measure reported to the House. Debate on
the bill occupied the Committee of the Whole the entire day of July 31,
in the course of which sixty members participated. Amended by the
House in some twenty-five particulars, the bill passed the next day by
a vote of 193 to 18, was signed by the Vice-president and Speaker
August 7, presented to the President the next day and received his
approval August 9.14

II. AN

ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE

An analysis of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,15 incorporated into
the Interstate Commerce Act as Part II thereof, establishes the measure as a comprehensive and significant initial enactment.
Purpose and Scope. Section 202 (a) sets forth the Congressional
policy as being to regulate motor carrier transportation so as to recognize and preserve its inherent advantages, foster sound economic conditions in this transportation in the public interest, promote ample,
1a48 STAT. 216, 49 U. S. C. A. § 263 (1933).
"SEN. Doc. 152, cited in SEN. REP. 482, 74th Cong., ist Sess., (1935) 2.
"H. R. Doc. 89, cited as in note 12, supra.
'The career of S. 1629 is chronicled in 79 CONG. REC. 1420, 5485, 5649, 5735,
5737, 5912, 11813, I21906-I2200, 12204-12237, 12278, 12279, 12459, 12617, 12709,
12712, 12863.

"Public Act 255, 74th Cong. ist Sess.
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efficient and economical motor transportation service at reasonable
charges "without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, and unfair or destructive practices," coordinate motor carrier
service with other forms of transportation and improve the relations
between motor and other carriers, expand and maintain a system of
highway transportation sufficient to the needs of commerce and national defense, and cooperate with the states and their agents and with
motor carrier organizations in the application of the act.
In scope the measure includes interstate and foreign motor transportation by common and contract carriers, brokers engaged in this
transportation business, and if the Interstate Commerce Commission
after investigation deems necessary, private carriers of property by
motor vehicle insofar as qualifications and maximum hours for employees, equipment, and safety of operation are concerned.
Motor operations exempted from regulation are indeed numerous:
school busses for pupils and teachers, taxicabs, hotel busses, busses in
national reservations, trolley busses, "motor vehicles controlled and
operated by any farmer, and used in the transportation of his agricultural commodities and products thereof or in transportation of supplies
to his farm," "motor vehicles controlled by a cooperative association,"
as set forth in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929; vehicles carrying exclusively livestock, fish, or agricultural commodities, or used
exclusively in the distribution of newspapers.
The most involved exemption is that extended to motor vehicles
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and transporting passengers
or property within a single municipality, or between municipalities
contiguous, or "within a zone adjacent to or commercially a part or
any such municipality or municipalities," except when such transportation is done under a common control, management or arrangement for
continuous transportation to or from the municipality or zone, and
"provided the motor carrier engaged in such transportation of passengers over regular or irregular route in interstate commerce" is
authorized by laws of the states having jurisdiction to offer intrastate
transportation of passengers over the whole length of the interstate
route concerned. To such transportation only the maximum hours,
equipment standards, and safety requirements as generally prescribed
by the Interstate Commerce Commission shall apply, unless the Commission by investigation from time to time finds the application of full
regulatory program is necessary to realize the Congressional declaration of policy. 16
"§ 203. By the same section casual, occasional, and reciprocal transportation
of passengers or goods in interstate or foreign commerce for pay by any one not

254
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The Duties of the Interstate Commerce CommissioA Under the
Act: (a) Safety Measures, etc. The duties of the Commission as set
forth by Section 204 include the establishment of reasonable requirements as to uniform accounting, records and their preservation, qualifications and maximum hours for employees, and safety of operation
and equipment for common and contract carriers, and reasonable requirements relativd to continuous and adequate service and handling
of baggage and express for common carriers. Private carriers of property may be subjected, if Commission decides there is need, to Commission requirements on safety, maximum hours, and standards of
equipment.
Licensing of motor transportation brokers, their financial responsibility, and their accounting, records, reporting, operations, and practices constitute matters on which the Commission is to establish proper
rules. Power to investigate on its own motion or on complaint the
organization and activity of motor carriers subject to the act, to recommend to Congress needed legislation, the handling of complaints, and
reconsideration thereof and "to administer, execute and enforce all
other provisions" of the measure is conferred on the Commission, at
whose disposal are put all Federal research agencies having special
knowledge of motor carrier operation, to the end that investigation may
proceed in a scientific manner.
Section 205 provides that wherever the actual or proposed operation
of motor carriers or of brokers involves not more than three states the
Commission must, and where more than three states the Commission
may, refer to joint boards 17 the following specific administrative matengaged in,motor vehicle transportation "as a regular occupation or business"
is likewise exempted.
"Joint boards are to consist of one member from each state involved, nominated
by the utility board of the state (or by the governor if the commission fails to
act) and appointed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. If neither the state
utility board nor the governor names a member for the joint board, the latter will
proceed without any representation from the failing state, provided as many as
two states do designate members. Joint board decisions are by majority vote. If
the joint board fails to act or fails to agree on a matter referred to it within 45
days, then the Commission shall decide the matter as if no resort had been made
to a joint board. Expenses of the joint board when handling referred matters are
allowed by the Commission, and existence of the joint board may be terminated
by the Commission at any time. Substitution of members of the joint board can
be made as in the case of original appointments. Joint boards when acting under
the statute have the same power of subpoena, production of papers and records,
administration of oaths, testimony of witnesses, and by deposition as the Commission itself has in the application of Part I to the railroads. The Commission
may hold joint meetings with state agencies on motor carrier questions, and space
in Federal buildings in Washington is to be assigned for use by the national
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ters: applications for the various forms of authorization to operate,
suspension, modification, or revocation of such authorization, applications for permission to consolidate, merge, or acquire control, complaints of violations by motor carriers or brokers of the provisions set
forth in Section 204 (a), complaints against motor carrier rates, or
practices, and any investigation and suspension proceeding, or other
matter not expressly specified in the above list.
Court review of Commission final orders issued under Part II remain substantially as set forth in Part I (applicable to non-motor
18
carriers) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
(b) Authorization to Operate: Certificates, Permits, and Licenses.
The forms of authorization to engage in the motor carrier business are
sufficiently different to warrant separate treatment. Common carriers
of passengers or of goods in interstate or foreign commerce 9 must
have a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Those operating
on intrastate routes but transporting passengers or goods which cross
state boundaries need not apply to the Commission if they have a
certificate from a state agency, or if there exists in the state an agency
empowered to grant the certificates. Others must apply to the Commission.
Bona fide operators as of June I, 1935 must apply for their certificates within 12o days after October 1, 1935 (the effective date of the
Motor Carrier Act). If the applicant or his predecessor in interest were
in bona fide operation on June 1, 1935, he gets the certificate of public
convenience as a matter of right without having to prove public convenience and necessity for the proposed service; being registered as
a member of a code of fair competition on the above date establishes
his character as a bona fide operator.
Applicants for certificates who were not bona fide operators on June
I, 1935 must prove fitness, willingness, and ability to offer the pfoposed service, to conform to the statutory requirements and Commission rules, and in addition must prove that either the present or future
public convenience and necessity demands the establishment of the
proposed service.
Finding the application in proper form and the supporting evidence
organization of state utility boards and their representatives and for use by the
joint boards.
'An exception provides that where a negative order is issued by the Commission solely because of a supposed lack of power, any party in interest can file
a complaint with the district court assembled under the act of October 22, 1913;
and if the court decides the Commission has the asserted power, it may "enforce
by mandatory injunction the Commission's taking of jurisdiction."

'Or in United States reservations or parks.
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adequate, the Commission issues the certificate subject to reasonable
terms, conditions and limitations as public convenience and necessity
requires, 20 and the Commission may attach such terms, conditions, and
limitations from time to time thereafter.
Conditions attached to a certificate cannot restrict the right of a
carrier to add to equipment and facilities over the routes, between the
termini, or within the area set forth in the certificate, as the demands
of the public ahd expansion of the business shall require. Occasional
deviations from the certificated route may be permitted by the Commission under its special rules, and the certificate may authorize the
transportation of express or mail either in the same vehicle with
passengers, or in separate vehicles.
By special rules of its own making the Commission may authorize
motor carriers of passengers to engage in special or charter service,
i.e., operation other than on regular route or between fixed termini.
Of particular importance is the declaration in Section 207 (b) that
no certificate issued confers any proprietory or property rights in the
use of the highways.
To operate motor contract carrier service requires a permit. As in
the case of certificates for common carriers, applications for permits
must be verified under oath, contain proper information, and be accompanied by proof of service upon such parties in interest as the
Commission may require. If the application and hearing thereon
establish the fitness, ability and willingness properly to perform the
service proposed, and to conform to the statutory provisions and Commission rules, and that the service to the degree to be authorized by
the permit will be consistent with the public interest and the public
policy set forth in the act itself, the Commission is directed to issue the
permit.
The permit must specify the activity of the contract carrier to whom
it is issued and the scope of that activity; there may be attached at the
time of issuance or at any time thereafter such reasonable terms and
conditions compatible with the character of contract carrier service as
are necessary to effectuate the regulatory service set forth by the
statute and Commission regulations pursuant thereto.
The formalities attendant upon obtaining a permit are waived in
cases of applicants who, or whose predecessors in interest, were engaged in bona fide operation July I, 1935; and, as in case of common
'State courts have repeatedly held that the term "public convenience and necessity" constitutes a singld and indivisible unit; hence my use of the singular verb
form. See the writer's M1fotor CarrierRegulation in Missouri (1928) 29 Mo. BAR
BULL. No. 48, p. 2a.
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carriers, being registered in a code of fair competition on that date
constitutes adequate proof of bona fide operation.
The statute forbids after January I, 1936 a common carrier to hold
a permit for contract carriage of goods over the same route or in the
same territory unless the Commission for good cause shown concludes
that the holding of both certificate and permit is consistent with the
public interest and with the statutory declaration of policy.
For anyone selling or offering to sell common carrier or contract
carrier transportation a broker's license is necessary. Such brokerage
is so defined as to cover the making of a contract, agreement or arrangement to obtain, provide, or supply such transportation, or holding
out oneself by advertisement, solicitation or otherwise as an agency
for such service.
To prevent licensed brokers as such from performing actual transportation, both certificates and permits specify the particular type of
transportation authorized. Holders of certificates or permits need no
license to solicit business if the transportation is to be furnished entirely by themselves or "jointly with other motor carriers holding like
certificates or permits or with a common carrier by railroad, express
or water."
To obtain a broker's license the applicant must prove fitness, willingness, and ability properly to perform the proposed service, and to conform to the Commission regulations relative thereto, and prove that
it will be consistent with public interest and the declared policy to
21
authorize the proposed service.
The period of certificates, permits, and licenses is indeterminate.
They may be suspended, changed, revoked or transferred, on application of the holder, on complaint, or on the initiative of the Commission;
notice and hearing are necessary, and changing, suspending or revoking can be done only for wilful failure to comply with the act and regulations thereunder, or with the term or condition attached to the certifi22
cate, permit, or license
(c) Merger, Consolidation and Acquisition of Control: Power of
'Brokers have 12o days after October i to apply for the license, and making
application entitles them to operate until ordered otherwise by the Commission. A
bond acceptable to the Commission as guaranteeing financial responsibility and
the furnishing of the service agreed upon is exacted of a broker as protection of
motor carrier travelers and shippers. To the same degree as are carriers themselves, brokers are subject to Commission jurisdiction as to accounts, records,
reports, inspection, and investigation.
"Grace of 9o days is allowed before authorization of a holder who wilfully
fails to comply can be revoked, and a longer period may be fixed if the Commission deems such extension reasonable.
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the Commission. A lengthy section 2 3 provides for merger, consolidation, and acquisition of control as between motor carriers not operating
rail service, between such a motor carrier and a railroad, express or
water transportation line, or the purchase, lease, or contract to operate
any motor carrier property. Such transactions involve (i) application
to the Commission, which thereupon notifies the governor of each state
in which any part of the equipment or operation is located, the carriers,
the applicant, and other known parties known to have a substantial
interest in the proceeding, of the time and place of a public hearing on
the matter; (2) satisfied that the proposed consolidation, merger, sale
or acquisition of control will be in the public interest, and that the
provisions of the statute have been met, the Commission approves the
transaction on such terms and with such modifications as it deems
reasonable. No consolidation, etc., will be allowed as between a motor
carrier and non-motor carrier unless the Commission finds that the
public interest will be promoted by allowing the non-motor carrier
24
operations, and will not unduly restrain competition.
Except as above set forth it is unlawful to attempt or effectuate,
directly or indirectly, control or management of two or more nonrailroad motor carriers by common directors, officers, stockholders,
holding or investment company or trust, "or in any other manner
whatsoever." And the continuance of any such control or management
after enactment of the statute is unlawful. Control or management
means power to exercise either control or management. On complaint
or its own motion the Commission may after notice and hearing investigate to determine whether unlawful control is being exercised;
finding positively, the Commission is directed to act, consistently with
the statute, to prevent further violation.
If no non-motor carrier is involved in a consolidation, etc., and no
more than 20 vehicles are involved no application or Commission approval is necessary.
In complying with germane orders of the Commission concerning
consolidations, etc., carriers and others affected by the section relating
thereto are exempt from all state and Federal anti-trust acts.
Security issues by common or contract carriers, persons acquiring
control, or corporations engaged in such transportation, in excess of
$500,000 must meet the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act,
I

'§ 213.

'Any person thus entering upon motor carrier service by Commission approval

becomes subject to Commission administration of accounts, records, reports, and
inspection of facilities as are the motor carriers themselves.
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and the exemption set forth in Section 3 (a) (6) of the 1933 securities
act applies to such issuance.
(d) Protection of the Public Against Operative Risks: the Commission's Power. Section 215 seeks to protect the public in judgments
against motor carriers for injuries to or death of any person or damage
to property resulting from negligent operation, maintenance, or use of
such vehicles authorized in such service by requiring holders of certificates and permits to ,furnish insurance, bonds, other securities, or
qualifications as self-insurers demanded by the Commission as reasonable. Discretion exists as to the amount the Commission may require
"conditioned on such carrier making compensation to shippers or
consignees of property which comes into the care of the carrier's
transportation service."
(e) Rates, Rebates, and Discriminations as Controlled by the Commission. The question of rates receives detailed consideration in the
statute.2 5 Common carriers of passengers must establish and enforce
"just and reasonable individual or joint rates" and just and reasonable
practices and regulations relating thereto, and to the issuance, substance and form of tickets, baggage, and all other matters relating to
such transportation. The common carriers of property are obligated to
include in their regulations specifications for packing, presenting,
marking, and delivering property entrusted to them. Both types must
provide safe and adequate service, equipment, and facilities for the
transportation offered, and they are obligated to make an equitable
division of joint rates so as to avoid undue prejudice to the interest of
any participating carrier.
The evils of rebates, discriminations and other favoritism are envisaged by the provisions safeguarding against a common carrier's
resorting to undue advantage, or preference, unjust or unreasonable
rate, unjust discrimination, or undue prejudice in its dealing with "any
person, port, gateway, locality, or class of traffic." These prohibitions
apply to common carriers only.
Provision is made for Commission acceptance, investigation, decision, and disposition of complaints as to any of the above-stated evils
when filed in writing by any person, state board, organization, or body
politic. Wide powers are conferred on the Commission in handling and
settling the complaints. Further, when a new schedule of individual or
joint rates, charges, or classification of traffic or practice pertaining
thereto is filed with the Commission, that body on its own motion or
on complaint of any party in interest may on reasonable notice, stage a
hearing on the lawfulness of the rate, charge, practice or classification,
1§§ 216, 217

and

218.

26o
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and pending such hearing the Commission can suspend that to which
objection has been made, notice to that effect being delivered to the
complainee. The period of suspension is limited normally to 90 days,
but if Commission finds itself unable to dispose of the matter in that
time the suspension can be extended another 90 days. The suspension
power does not apply to an initial schedule, or to those filed by any
common carrier in bona fide operation on effective date.
Into the justness or reasonableness of the rate, fare, or charge of
any motor common carrier, good will, earning power, or the carrier's
certificate shall not enter. just and reasonable rates for common carriers shall admit as elements the inherent advantages of such transportation, the effect of the rate on the movement of motor common
carrier traffic, public interest need of adequate and efficient service at
lowest cost consistent with furnishing the service, and the needs of
sufficient revenues to enable the motor common carriers through
"honest, efficient and economical management to provide such service."
Every motor common carrier is to file with the Commission and
post for public inspection tariffs of all charges in connection with service offered over its own routes, and if it is a party to a joint rate, then
also the joint rates to which it is a party. The statute forbids charging
a higher or lower rate than that published. Refunds and rebates, directly or indirectly are prohibited, with the proviso that Sections 1 (7)
and 22(1) of Part I (applicable to non-motor carriers) apply to motor
common carriers subject to Part II.
Proposed changes in tariffs are registered with the Commission, and
cannot go into effect for 3o days after notice of proposed change has
been filed with the Commission. But the Commission is empowered to
change the 3o-day notice, and the requirements relative to filing and
posting tariffs by either general order, or by special order applicable
to the particular case.
Contract carriers are subjected to less comprehensive regulation
as to rates. They must file and keep open for public inspection their
schedules, or if the Commission prefers, copies of their contracts showing minimum charges for transportation they offer, and also any rule,
regulation or practice affectipng such transportation. Direct or indirect
change in the rates or charges, or in any practice affecting such charge
can be made only after 30 days' notice filed with the Commission.28
Contract carriers are forbidden to charge less than the rates filed,
either directly or through special services, facilities or privileges. But

'But the Commission may as in the case of common carriers, reduce the 30
days of notice. Proposed changes must be (as is true relative to common carriers)
plainly stated as to substance and effective date.
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the Commission on receipt of request from any contract carrier or class
thereof may grant relief from the filing requirements to the extent and
for such time as the Commission deems warranted.
After hearing on a complaint or on its own motion, if it finds the
rates, charges, practices or regulations of contract carriers contravene
public policy as set forth in the act, the Commission may prescribe the
minimum rate, rule or practice desirable in the public interest and to
promote the public policy. But in fixing the minimum rate, rule or
practice for contract carriers, the Commission is admonished to give
no advantage or preference to a contract carrier competing with a
motor common carrier, which advantage or preference the Commission
finds to be undue or inconsistent with the public interest. In prescribing the minimum rate, rule or practice the Commission must give consideration to (i) cost of service rendered by contract carriers, and
(2) the effect of such minimum rate, rule, or practice on movement of
traffic of contract carriers. Only minimum rates can be fixed for contract carrier, but Commission can prescribe minimum or maximum, or
27
minimum and maximum rates for motor common carriers.
Except as the Commission may permit by rules and regulations, a
carrier must collect all charges for transportation of goods before the
goods are delivered. But the Commission cannot so require the payment of charges on goods consigned to the government of the United
States, of a state, or political subdivision thereof.
(f) Bills of Lading, Accounts and Reports. Section 2i9 subjects
motor common carriers to the bills of lading requirement imposed by
Part I on non-motor carriers of property. Thus common carriers by
motor have the same liability for losses and damages as have railroads.
Extensive power over accounts, reports and records of all common
and contract carriers, and brokers is vested in the Commission. The
authority extends to requiring a copy of any agreement with any other
carrier or any non-carrier person relative to a motor vehicle traffic
in interstate or foreign commerce. The period for which the records
are to be kept can be specified by the Commission. To exercise this
administrative power over reports, etc., the examination and inspection
of the Commission or its agents extends to records, etc., accumulated
before enactment of the statute as well as after.
(g) Designated Agency to Receive Service of Process: Commission's Power to Require. To expedite the service of process, orders,
and notice, every common and contract carrier must file with the Com'Power to suspend proposed changes in rates, charges, practices or rules of
contract carriers can be made by the Commission on the same conditions and to
the same degree as in case of motor common carriers.
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mission the name and address of a designated proper person to receive
such service. Adequate process consists of either personal service, or
registered mail, and date of mailing is date of service. The Commission
enjoys wide discretion as to the effective date and the duration of its
orders.
The Penalties and Enforcement Provisionsset up by thg Act. For
wilfully or knowingly violating the Motor Carrier Act, any rule or
regulation or order of the Commission, or any term, condition, or
limitation attached by it to an authorization to operate, a person
convicted is subject to a fine of $5oo for the first offense, and each
day of violation constitutes a separate offense.
Knowingly offering, accepting, or soliciting a rebate or concession,
or through falsification or misrepresentation by any means or device
wilfully permitting or assisting any person to get passengers or property transported for less than the applicable rate, or wilfully or knowingly resorting to fraudulent evasion or defeat of a regulation set forth
in the act constitutes a misdemeanor and subjects the offender, whether
connected with motor vehicle transportation or not, to a fine of $500,
and $2,00o for each subsequent offense. Any agent or examiner who
divulges any information or fact discovered in the course of his duties,
except as directed by the Commission or proper Federal court, is subject to a fine of $5,ooo and two years imprisonment.
For wilful failure or refusal to make reports or keep accounts and
records as directed by the Commission, or for wilful falsification,
mutilation or destruction of such records, accounts, or reports, any
motor carrier or its agent may be fined from $IOO to $500.
Either the Commission or its agent may apply to a Federal district
court for injunction or other process to compel obedience to the statute,
or the orders, rules, or regulations of the Commission.
Future Regulation and Effective Date. With an eye to future improvement of hours of service, safety of operation, and more effective
utilization of highways, Section 225 authorizes the Commission to
investigate qualifications of employees, proper hours, size and weight
of equipment and to make to Congress recommendations for legislation
thereon.
Effective date of the act is fixed at October I, 1935; but under
authority conferred by the act the Commission has postponed the
effective date of parts of the act as follows: (i) Sections dealing with
filing of application for certificates, permits and licenses and issuance
of these from October i to October 15, 1935; (2) Provisions relating

"to filing and observance of tariff schedules," etc., from October I to
December i, later to January 15 in some respects, and in others to
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February 14, 1936, and still further postponed to March 2 and April I,
1936, the maximum postponement limit allowed by the act.a

III. AN EVALUATION OF THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT

OF

1935

Any attempt at evaluation of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 must
recognize its controlling substantive kinship to the state regulatory
developments since 1915. The distinction between common and contract carriers has been validly drawn in the states after considerable
trial and error.2 8 Federal provisions relative to certification, requirements as to safety of operation and liability insurance, rates, service,
financial affairs, and more definitely routine matters like accounts,
records, and reports all stem from state regulation of intrastate transportation.
The Provisions on the Subject of Authorization to Operate. The
inevitable vagueness of meaning attaching to the provisions on Federal
certification will be clarified as interpretation proceeds; the present
stated conditions are less restrictive than the conditions surrounding
state certification. 29 In conditioning issuance of certificates on proof
that either present or future public convenience and necessity warrants
the proposed common carrier service, the Federal act makes a distinct
advance by admitting futurity as a proper basic element.
"Public convenience and necessity" as a condition of certification
aroused some objection, but the Senate committee retained the term
in the bill because most of the state statutes used it, and numerous

Commission and court opinions have interpreted it.30 The stability and
progress of motor common carrier transportation depend on requiring
-a.

C. C., Bureau of Motor Carriers, orders dated Sept. I9, Sept 30, and Nov.

8, 1935, and Jan. 2, 1936. The importance of Feb. i4 as the filing limit was stressed
by Director John L. Rogers at the Bus Conference at New York on Jan. ii.
N. Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1936, at 34 L.
'Particularly California-Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 271
U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. ed. 11o (1926) ; Michigan-Michigan Public
Utility Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. 191, 69 L. ed. 445 (1925) ;
Ohio-Hissem v. Guran, 146 N. E. 8o8 (1925) ; Florida-Smith v. Cahoon, 283
U. S. 553, 5i Sup. Ct 582, 75 L. ed. 1264 (193i). Valid distinction appears in
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 52 Sup. Ct 595, 76 L. ed.
1155 (1932) ; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 52 Sup. Ct 581, 76 L. ed. 1167
(1932) ; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct. 281, 77 L. ed. 288
(1932) ; and Hicklin v. Coney, 29o U. S. 169, 54 Sup. Ct. 142, 78 L. ed. 247

(33).
'See the writer's Factors in Granting Motor Carrier Certificates of Public
Convenience and Necessity (930)
5 IND. L. J. 243.
"'79CONG. Rw. 5653 (i935).
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public convenience and necessity as the basis of authorization to
operate. 3 '
The statutory view that bona fide operators on June I, 1935 possess
vested rights sufficient for certification on that ground alone follows
the practice current in most of the states during the "formative period"
of establishing state regulation. While not requiring the bona fide
operator on the effective date to prove public convenience and necessity
as a basis for the certificate Ohio did not allow him to continue operation without obtaining a certificate. The highest court in that state ruled
that the bona fide operator could not be legally excused from the certificate requirement. 32 That such a requirement does not deny him
equal protection of the law; and that so granting the bona fide operator
a certificate "as a matter of right" while denying it thus to others constitutes no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we hear from the
same tribunal in a subsequent case. 33 The California Supreme Court
has upheld the Commission declaration that complaints against a
carrier certificated on a bonk fide operation basis are to be handled as
34
if he had proved public convenience and necessity.
Choosing as the controlling date for bona fide operators a date prior
to the time of statutory enactment or effectiveness has no doubt served
to discourage many adventurous persons from racing to beat the deadline beyond which certificates would issue only on proved public convenience and necessity.
To facilitate the certification process, several provisions have been
inserted: registration under a code of fair competition as adequate
proof of bona fide operation; the 12o days of grace allowed for applying
for authorization; and the waiving of Federal certification in the case
of those interstate carriers whose vehicular operation is confined to the
limits of a particular state.
Requiring brokers to get a license finds no expression in state regulation, and therefore constitutes a regulatory novelty.
Permits are a new regulatory device for-recognizing the difference
between common and contract carriers.3 5 The former are full-fledged
'Id. 122o6.

'McClain v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, iio Ohio St. I, 143 N. E.
381 (1924). Oregon early waived the "formality" of certificating bona fide operators. Laws 1925, c. 380, § ig.
'Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, I1 Ohio St.
681, 146 N. E. 84 (924).
'Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 189 Cal. 573, 209
Pac. 586 (1922).
'The intricate but fascinating problems of contract motor carriers have been
treated exhaustively in the writer's Public Control of Contract Motor Carriers
(1933) 9 JouRNAL OF LAND AND PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 233-246.
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public utilities; contract carriers are yet viewed largely as private
enterprise. But because of their relation to common carriers and their
use of public highways, involving necessarily public safety and public
efficiency in the use of the highways the public utility character of contract carriers, recognized to a noticeable degree by the Supreme Court
in Stephenson v. Binford3oa and in Hicklin v. Coney35b is being developed rapidly. Significant possibilities for developing this public
utility character lie in the Federal provision that a non-bona fide
operator applicant! for a permit prove that permitting his proposed
service will be consistent with public interest. (Section 209 b.) Clearly,
to require contract carriers to prove public convenience and necessity
as a basis for the permit would transform them into common carriers
and therefore public utilities against their will. Such proof from contract carriers was undertaken by Florida in 1931, but the Supreme
Court declared the requirement invalid. 30 However, the same tribunal
a year later in a Texas case3 7 recognized a decided public interest in
contract carriers and approved the permit requirement.
Cannot future construction interpret public "interest" as substantially equivalent to "public convenience and necessity" required for common carrier operation, and thereby actually erase the differentiation
which is recognized today?
Safety and Hours for Employees. Extensive House debate on the
provisions for safety of operation and the hours of service for employees
attests their vital interrelationship.38 Temporary regulations are to be
set up by the Commission (Section 204) but the authorization to that
body to investigate size and weight of vehicles and the qualifications
and maximum hours of employees and to report to Congress thereon
anticipates specific Congressional legislation on the subject.
Practically unanimous is the view that regulation must seek safety
of highway travel, and a more humane treatment of employees than
now obtains in working them I8 to 20 hours a day, and even lOO-120
hours with only 2 or 3 hours rest.3 9 "Drivers' drowsiness" appears a
potent cause of highway accidents and the contention is ably made that
such a cause inevitably results from the lengthy hours to which truck
and bus drivers are subjected.
To the bill as reported by the House committee, Representative
-'sa287U.

S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct. i8i, 77 L. ed. 288 (1932).
S. i69, 54 Sup. Ct. i42, 78 L. ed. 247 (1933).
"Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 51 Sup. Ct. 582, 75 L. ed. 1265 (I93i).
'Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct. I8I, 77 L. ed. 288 (1932).
'Discussion of safety and hours of service of employees is interspersed throughout pages 2209-37 of 79 CONG. REC. (i935).
'Rep. Monaghan, citing National Safety Council reports.
35b 2 9 0 U.
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Monaghan offered an amendment whereby the Commission would prohibit an employer from working an employee in interstate or foreign
motor commerce longer than 8 hours in 24 with less than 12 hours free
before resuming operation of the vehicle. In behalf of this proposal
argument was projected thus :40 impairment of employees' efficiency
and health results from present excessive hours; wide disparity exists
between hours of interstate motor transportation employees and those
of railway workers; the serious endangering of life on the highways
results from operation of vehicles by exhausted employees; and Congress has already made provision for an 8-hour day for railroad workers.
Arguments against the Monaghan amendment included: particular
demands of truck and bus operation preclude a rigid schedule of hours;
drivers of carrier trucks and busses are not the cause of highway accidents ;41 inadequate are the data available on which to'base a definite
hours schedule; uncertainty exists as to what safety regulations to
make or what standards of equipment to set; adoption of the amendment would drive motor carrier traffic to the railr6ads; and the fact
that the House committee had rejected the' Monaghan amendment
42
while it had the bill under consideration.
Despite William Green's support of the 8-hour provision and Representative Monaghan's willingness to accept an "emergency driving"
amendment to his amendment, the proposal was beaten on a division,
36-34."s
This 8-hour amendment, the arguments thereon, and its narrow
defeat merely strengthen the general conviction that hours of service
for employees, and congestion of highway traffic resulting from operation of motor carriers constitute a paramount problem the solution of
which depends to an unusual degree upon the wise exercise of discretion posed in the Commission. Vital significance attaches to the
scope, manner, and spirit of investigation to be staged and to the
soundness of recommendations made to Congress, and the adequacy
of regulations set up by the Commission meantime or instituted later
by specific enactment of Congress.
'Rep. Monaghan received vigorous support from Rep. Cooper, a former
railroad engineer, who related his experience with drowsiness from 36-hour shifts
in the "good old days" of railroading in Ohio 25 years ago; and from Rep. Crawford, operator of extensive truck fleets in Michigan.
'Rep. Rankin paid truck drivers a compliment in which the writer joins; Rep.
Truax considered the chief characteristic of truck drivers to be plain hoggishness.
'Reps. Pettingill and Terry of the House committee on interstate and foreign
commerce led the opposition.
'79 CoxG. REc. 12230 (1935). House proceeding as Committee of the Whole.
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Rate Fixing.Only potential and ultimate control over rates is created
by the act. No power to fix any rates ab initio is conferred on the
Commission. Only common carriers are obligated to establish just and
reasonable rates. Exemption of contract carriers from the "just and
reasonable" rate requirement rests on their having no definite route or
fixed termini and the varying conditions of contract service; these
facts reveal the private enterprise character of contract carrier service.
A practical reason for withholding Commission power to fix initial
rates for common carriers is lack of data as to cost of service.
To the provisions of the original bill that compulsory through routes
and joint rates be established between any type of motor carrier and
rail, express, or water carriers, well-nigh unanimous objection from
small carriers voiced the fear that railroads would thereby obtain a
marked preference ;44 hence the permissive power granted over through
routes and joint rates. To protect the carriers is the primary purpose
of the provision for Commission review of joint rates and for the correction of division of joint rates.
Powdr to suspend proposed rates, after complaint, constitutes an
indispensable weapon to prevent destructive competition among railroads, busses and trucks, according to Senator Wheeler; truck operators see in suspension protection against destructive competition
among themselves, and fear that in absence of suspension power relative to motor carrier rates, the railroads will seek exemption from the
power of suspension when they lower their rates to meet motor carrier
competition.

45

The early proposal to suspend proposed rates only if'they come below the cost of service was soon abandoned because of the virtual
impossibility of determining the cost of service; suspension can apply
to the lower or higher rate proposed by the carrier. If the suspension
is applied to a proposed rate, the published rate of the carrier continues. Unless the Commission decides the rate is unreasonable within
the maximum 18o days, the proposed rate goes into effect. But the
value of this suspension power is impaired by the prohibition of applying it to initial rates filed by any common carrier.
Contract carriers merely file and publish their rates. Commission
authority to fix the minimum charge after complaint emphasizes primarily Congressional concern with protecting directly the competing
carriers and indirectly the shippers. The safeguards erected against
reduction of rates bespeak a fear of irresponsible rate-cutting by contract carriers, an exercise which in recent years has characterized if not
"79 CONG. RM. 5655 (1935).
"Ibid.
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produced truck "wars," which have resulted in no lasting benefit to
the public.
Representative Martin discovers serious if not insurmountable obstacles to getting relief from unreasonable rates through complaints.4"
The complainant will have to prove the rate "unduly preferential,"
"unjustly discriminatory" or "unduly prejudicial," and from experience of shippers with railroad rates against which they complained
under an act containing none of the terms quoted above, Martin is
convinced the complaint method will prove futile. For this reason he
insists vigorously that the act sets up no regulation of rates.
As regards this point the position seems well taken if "regulation"
means only positive, actual fixing of rates by the statute. But "regulation" can proceed indirectly and ultimately as well as by direct and
immediate declaration.
Because of inevitable variations in rates for substantially the same
service, similar charges for noticeably different service, the future
creation of new classifications of service, the rivalry between contract
and common carriers, and that between motor carriers, who are not
operating on publicly fixed rate schedules, and the railroads whose
rates are so fixed, the public fixing of motor carrier rates can be expected in less time than public fixing of railroad rates was realized;
i.e. the 30 years between 1887 and 19o6. 4 7 That fixing will proceed by
recognizing as valid the fabric of rates already established" and of
those now being established. If necessary the statutory prohibition

against Commission consideration of railroad rates as a yardstick in
regulating motor carrier rates will be modified or repealed.
Competition or Monopoly? Which is Provided by the Act? Does
the Motor Carrier Act foster competition or promote monopoly in
motor transportation? Regulatory experience of the states and the provisions of the act itself can be examined with profit.
The Annual Digest of Public Utility Reports for 1915 is silent on
competition between motor carriers and railroads and between motor
carriers themselves, but the 1920 issue shows the contest is on in
earnest. Thereafter the record is replete with evidence that the purpose
and policy of state regulation are to restrict competition in the interest
of both efficient service and highway safety. Public interest has long
demanded that the number of authorized vehicles be kept at a minimum
4679 CoNG. REc. 1i6
'24 STAT. 384 (1887)

(i935).

STAT. 589 (i9o6) ; 49 U. S. C. A. 402 (1929).
"See the writer's Motor CarrierService and Rates (929) 3 U. OF CiN. L.
REV. 269-89.
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so as to facilitate a more efficient use of highways by motorists.

49

State efforts have revealed a determination to restrict the number of
vehicles authorized after the effective date, but to allow competition
among those operating on the effective date and thereby entitled to
certification without proving public convenience and necessity. Protection for established carriers has received particularly strong emphasis in Ohio, Illinois, Massachusetts and California.
To this background of regulatory experience, the provisions of the
Federal statute impart a firm tone of adaptation and continuance in the
Federal field. Authorization to operate will be successfully invoked in
only occasional cases in the near future, for there is seldom discovered
a dearth of vehicles already in operation. The provisions relating to
consolidation and merging anticipate a limiting of competition among
present bona fide and soon-to-be Federally authorized carriers. Public
convenience and necessity will be interpreted in the direction of
monopoly.
That the drift will be definitely toward monopoly is manifest in the
debates on the measure during passage. Representatives Christianson
and Mitchell see the creation of a monopoly in highway transport and
Representative Holmes' assurance that anyone will have a right to
enter the trucking business "provided he has a sound and sufficient
reason" merely substantiates the monopoly conclusion.5"
How will railroads fare in the trends toward monopoly in interstate
motor transportation? Experience shows that some ten states have
legislated to permit railroads to enter the bus business; in other states
they may so engage through interpretation of regulatory measures. In
self-defense railroads have established bus subsidiaries operating in
interstate commerce, and several jurisdictions have held that railroads
are both entitled and obligated to provide additional motor transportation deemed necessary by the regulatory commission. 51
Representative Crawford reports that railroads are acquiring numerous trucking lines. He expects the statute to check such acquisition and
"The strength of these various factors is attested by some 50 cases cited in
footnotes 3-29 in the writer's Principlesof Motor CarrierRegulation (1929) 63
AM. L. REV. 72. More recent evidence appears in the writer's Bus v. Rail Case
(93)
II Bus TRANSPORTATION 625-26.
Z79

CONG. REC. 12214 (1935).

'Massachusetts in Re New Haven Railroad, P. U. R. I926B, 338, 341 (1925);
New Jersey in Re Choate and Tumulty v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners,
P. U. R. I928A, 98 (1927) ; District of Columbia in Re Washington Railway
and Electric Co., 1922C, 754 (1922) ; Missouri in Re Kansas City, etc., Stage
Lines Co. (1930).

5 PuBLIc

UTiLITES FORTNIGHTLY 7o4.
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maintain competition between the motor truck and the railroad by
52
eliminating broker's loot and rebate loot.

In the relation of motor carriers and rail carriers the regulation of
the rates of the former constitutes a vital factor. Such a conclusion is
substantiated by the Huddleston substitute bill omitting all provisions
on rates, and the views of Representatives Wadsworth (supporting
53
the substitute), Snell, Fulmer, Pierce and Truax.
Hardly less significant than rate control is the ability of railroads on
entering the motor transportation field to offer financial responsibility
for damages and losses arising in course of operation in lieu of the very
expensive insurance policies or bonds required of less fortunate
carriers.
Inescapable is the conclusion that experience in state control, operating economies, the provisions of the statute admitting railroads to the
acquisition of motor carriers, and the fact that the railroads supported
the bill insures increased railway participation in motor transportation
of passengers and freight.
The Public Interest Motivation in the Act. Pervading if not including all phases of regulation encompassed by the statute we find the
ubiquitous concepts "public interest" and "public convenience and
necessity." These principles are as incapable of comprehensive definition as the terms police power, due process, and equal protection.
The motives actuating these regulatory principles as applied to
interstate motor carriers can be stated as (i) to preserve the highways;
(2) to obtain adequate and proper service at fair cost; (3)to restrict
competition between motor carriers and between motor carriers and
railroads; and (4)to promote safety of operation.
What is the meaning of public? "Not all the people all the time" said
the Colorado Supreme Court, which stated further that a service affecting a sufficient part of the public as is affected by any other service
known as public is to be dealt with as a public service. 5 Under this
involved definition what determines the choice of that with which a
comparison is to be made, and what is the degree of similarity necessary to exist in order to establish a satisfactory resemblance? Consider
the vagueness bound up in the rangy effort of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court: "Public pertains to the people of a nation, state, or community
at large, the general body, indefinitely, or as a whole or entirety."5 5

5'79

CONG. REc. 12223 (1935).
12233-34; 12215; 12211; 12217;

'Id., (in order stated) at

and

12224.

'Davis v. Colorado, 79 Colo. 642, 247 Pac. 8oi (1926).
'Chicago Rock Island and Pacific Railroad v. Oklahoma, 123 Okla. i9o,
Pac. 849 (1926).

252

FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER ACT
Equal doubt, uncertainty, and potentiality attach to "interest" and
"convenience and necessity." Is "convenient" "handy," or merely
"accessible"? Does "necessity" mean "indispensable", and if so, absolutely indispensable, or reasonably indispensable?
These reflections convince one that mere technical training in law
or administration is not sufficient qualification for interpreting and
applying the Motor Carrier Act. Proper performance of the task
requires substantial grounding in economics and social behavior, broad
sympathies, and an intelligent and penetrating philosophy of government.
Concessionsto the States.Utilization of joint boards whose members
are designated by the states and approved by the Commission to handle
problems involving motor carriers whose operation extends to not
more than three states gives the states a stake in the administration of
the act. And as a conscious concession to "states rights" the device
facilitated the enactment of the bill."'
Justification for resort to this joint board plan lies in the economic
facts (i) that only a small percentage of motor carriers and of the
motor transportation business is interstate, thereby denying the feasibility of an expensive separate Federal administrative machinery;
(2) that most of the motor transportation is short haul and therefore
local in character, thereby comporting with utilization of state agencies
encouragingly experienced in motor carrier control; (3) of expense
and inconvenience to the numerous small carriers of traveling to Washington for regulatory business, or the alternative expense of setting up
numerous local branches of Federal administrative machinery; and
(4) that the Interstate Commerce Commission can easily forego further addition to its present burdens.57
Convinced that Federal regulation was inevitable, the National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners, long opposed to extension of Federal control, supported the utilization of state commissioners rather than see separate Federal administration instituted.5 8
Precedent for this Federal use of state administrative agencies is
abundant, and while the United States cannot compel state officials
to administer Federal law, they may choose to cooperate unless state
law prohibits; and state law may compel them to so act. 59
"See statements by Representatives Crawford (Mich.) and Truax (Ohio) 79
CONG. Rmc. 12224 (1935).

'Paul G. Kauper, Utilization of State Cominissioners, etc. (1935)
L. REV. 37, 40-45.
5'Id.

at 46.
"Id. at 46-49 and 75-77, citing lengthy authority.

34 MIcH.
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Similarly a concession to the states is the provision that any interstate carrier whose route is confined to one state but who transports in
interstate commerce need not seek Federal certification if he already
holds a state certificate or if there is a certificate issuing agency in the
state.
To the same effect is the Commission discretion to exempt from
Federal control (except as to hours of employees, standards of equipment, and safety of operation) all carriers operating across state lines
in municipal and metropolitan areas so long as the Commission finds
the state laws sufficiently regulatory to achieve the purposes of the
Federal act.
But in barring the "Shreveport doctrine" from the Commission
power over rates, the statute makes the most signal concession to the
states. As introduced into the Senate, the bill denied all intention to
interfere with the "exclusive" exercise by each state of power to regulate intrastate commerce. Many of the bus and truck witnesses before
the Senate committee hearings favored incorporation of the Shreveport
doctrine, and a majority of the committee members, not including
Chairman Wheeler, struck out the "exclusive" from the original bill,
and reported out the measure with this provision:
"Nothing in this part shall be construed to affect the powers
of taxation of the several states or authorize a motor carrier to do
intrastate business on the highways of any state or to interfere
with the exercise of each state of the power of regulation of intrastate'commerce by motor carriers on the highways thereof, except
where and to the extent that such causes undue or unreasonable
disadvantages, or prejudice to persons or localities in interstate
commerce."
To bar the Shreveport doctrine from the measure, Senator Duffy
offered from the floor an amendment which Chairman Wheeler characterized as not only eliminating the Shreveport doctrine but also as
forbidding Commission regulation of rates of trucks which leaving a
point within the state go outside and thence promptly back into the state
.(claiming they thereby constitute themselves interstate carriers),60
and hindering the Commission in the regulation of hours of employees
and the safety of operation. Advising the Senate to go slowly relative
to including the Shreveport doctrine, Senator Gore obtained the deletion of the "except" clause of the provision reported by the committee.6 1
'On this resort to subterfuge see the writer's Interstate Motor CarrierRegulation in 1930 (1931) io Bus TRANSPORTATIoN 575, and particularly the opinion
of the Supreme Court in the Grubb case in his Motor CarrierLitigation in the
Supreme Court since 1929 (1934) 22 Ky. L. J. 199, 200-201.
'For these developments in the Senate see 79 CoNG. REc. 5736, 5737 (1935).
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Sensing the importance of the controversy over the Shreveport doctrine, the House committee reported the bill with an amendment prohibiting Federal regulation of intrastate motor transportation as Federal regulation of railroad intrastate commerce had been exercised
under the Shreveport doctrine. 6 2 And the final measure provides:
"That nothing in this part shall empower the Commission to
prescribe, or in any manner regulate, the rate fare, or charges
for intrastate transportation, or for any service therewith, for the
purpose of removing discrimination against interstate commerce
or for any other purpose."0' 3
Whether outlawing the Shreveport doctrine can be adjudged advisable on merit, such a step constitutes a decidedly teactionary move;
but it facilitated the passage of the measure and can be ounted on to
enlist a hearty state cooperation in the application of the statute.
The Constitutionality of the New Act. Of course the principle of
Congressional regulation of interstate motor transportation is beyond
cavil. But particular provisions of the 1935 act may be subjected to
judicial scrutiny before regulation has advanced very far.
Bringing contract carriers within the regulatory scope rests on the
Supreme Court pronouncements in Stephenson v. Binford.64 But the
potential minimum of Federal regulation intended for private motor
carriers in interstate commerce presents a novelty in public control of
motor carriers.
Operative rights resulting from establishment of service prior to
June I, 1935 are taken care of by the "bona fide operation" condition
sufficing for formal authorization under the act. Little doubt could be
entertained that brokers' activity is not directly and vitally related to
interstate motor transportation if not actually a part of it.
Closely parallel to established law and practice in regard to railroads
are the provisions dealing with motor carrier rates, hours of service
for employees, and safety. 65 From the opinion by Justice Brandeis in
'Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report (to accompany S.
1629), July 24, 1935.
/
/(
81§216 (e) of Public Act 255, 74th Cong. Ist Sess. '- / .f,
8287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct 181, 77 L. ed. 288 (1932). More recently sfressed

in Hicklin v. Coney, 29o U. S. 169, 54 Sup. Ct. 142, 78 L. ed. 247 (1933).
"Validity of these provisions is ventured on the basis of B. & 0. v. I. C. C.,
221 U. S.612, 31 Sup. Ct. 621, 55 L. ed. 878 (1911) ; So. Ry. v. U. S., 222 U. S.
20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2, 56 L. ed. 72 (1911) ; Hendrick v. Md., 235 U. S. 61o, 35 Sup.
Ct. 140, 59 L. ed. 585 (1915) ; Kane v. N. J., 242 U. S. i6o, 37 Sup. Ct. 36, 61 L.
ed. 222 (1916) ; Morris v. Duby, 274 U. S. 135, 47 Sup. Ct. 548, 71 L. ed. 966
(1927) ; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307,48 Sup. Ct. 324, 69 L. ed. 623 (1928) ;
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S.374, 52 Sup. Ct. 58r, 76 L. ed. 1167 (1932) ; and
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S.251, 53 Sup. Ct. 181, 77 L. ed. 288 (1932).
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Sprout v. South Bend,66 the insurance requirements set forth by the
statute seem beyond question.
No doubt can be entertained that constituting state officials Federal
agencies for administration of Federal law is valid, for "the Supreme
Court considers the question well settled in favor of the constitutionality of the practice."

'6 7

Whatever attacks are made on the act bid fair to center on the Congressional delegation of power to the Commission. Despite the fact
that the Supreme Court is especially sensitive just now as to delegation
of power, the conferring of broad discretion on the Commission is
expected to be sustained.
Administrative Problems. While the statute has encompassed all
essential phases of interstate motor carrier activity, the actual extent
to which and rapidity with which the administrative process shall move
toward the legislative objective are matters left largely to the discretion
of the Commission. This constitutes the general and inclusive problem.
One specific problem is that of interpretation. Such terms as "casual,
occasional, and reciprocal operation," "public interest," "public convenience and necessity," "unjust discrimination," "undue prejudice,"
"undue advantage," "adequate service" and "just and reasonable rates"
must depend for their meaning and application primarily on Commission philosophy and judgment. These various phrases present as baffling a task in construction as that begun by Marshall relative to the
necessary and proper clause in McCulloch v. Maryland.68
The formulation of rules and regulations constitutes a second administrative problem. The initial encounter with this problem will come
in regard to hours of service, standards of equipment, and safety of
operation, and caution will characterize Commission contact. Formulation of just and reasonable rate standards for a multitude of types and
classifications of motor transportation will soon challenge and tax
Commission ingenuity.
Enforcement of established regulations upon 250,000 motor transportation enterprises throughout the United States presents a humiliating task to the boldest of agencies. To perform that task at all satisfactorily will require the cleverest tact and the utmost in patience.
But in-tackling these herculean administrative problems the Commission can rely upon a vast body of regulatory precedent and the fact
that the measure received in its enactment more than substantial sup'277 U. S. 162, 48 Sup. Ct. 5o2, 72 L. ed. 833 (1928).
OKauper, supra note 57, at 71-73, citing ample authority.
6817 U. S.316, 4 L. ed. 579 (18ig).
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port from the various interests affected. Further, it can count on the
wholehearted cooperation of the President and Congress. If the Commission can command intelligence and tact throughout its administrative personnel and fair consideration of its rulings is obtained in the
courts, its success in administering the 'Motor Carrier Act in the public
interest is assured.

